Australian Bureau of Statistics
5257.0.55.001 - Information Paper: Recording Emissions Reduction Schemes in ABS Statistics, Jul 2012
Latest ISSUE Released at 11:30 AM (CANBERRA TIME) 30/07/2012 First Issue
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2. THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1997 created the Kyoto Protocol international agreement. The Kyoto Protocol aims to reduce GHG emissions in the atmosphere thereby improving the quality of the world's environment and mitigate the effects of climate change. Underlying the Kyoto Protocol is scientific evidence that suggests GHG is contributing to global warming by trapping heat in the earth's atmosphere. CO2 is the principal GHG that arises from human activities and is largely produced from the burning of fossil fuels. The Kyoto Protocol also addresses the impact of methane, nitrous oxide and other industrial gases. Australia is a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, 38 countries have committed to an emissions target. The Kyoto Protocol's first period aim is the reduction of GHG by at least 5 percent, below the 1990 level of GHG between 2008 and 2012. In December 2001, Australia ratified the Kyoto Protocol and it was implemented in 2008. Australia has a 2050 target of reducing emissions by 60 percent to the 2000 level of GHG. The Kyoto Protocol lists a number of mechanisms through which emissions can be controlled and monitored. These mechanisms are economic in nature and operate by increasing the cost of emissions intensive production processes and the relative prices of emissions intensive products.
The effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol depends on two critical factors:
The Kyoto Protocol includes a set of monitoring and compliance procedures in order to enforce its rules, address compliance problems and avoid errors in calculating emissions. It establishes three mechanisms through which emissions may be reduced and monitored:
The Kyoto Protocol does not discuss direct regulation or carbon taxes as 'mechanisms'. In Australia, the Australian Clean Energy Regulator (a statutory agency in the Climate Change Portfolio) monitors emissions and enforces compliance under the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act (NGER) 2007.
In essence, the Kyoto Protocol and its associated mechanisms aim to internalise an economic externality. Before the Kyoto Protocol, the emission of GHG was a cost free activity in economic terms. The Kyoto Protocol seeks to impose a cost of emissions on emitters and subsequently the cost of consumption of goods and services that are produced using inputs that result in emissions. In accordance with national accounting practice, economic statistics exclude externalities and should not record emissions values. However, implementation of market mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol will require economic statistics to value and record the impact of emissions.
In order to discourage emissions, all GHG emissions reduction mechanisms seek to impose a cost on emitters. The mechanisms for reducing GHG fall into two broad categories:
Both mechanisms generally raise the relative prices of emissions intensive products. This provides an incentive for producers and consumers to switch to less emissions intensive processes and products. There has been a debate about the design of policy instruments based on the different mechanisms:
There are a number of GHG emissions reduction schemes that can be applied. The following schemes, some of which are recommended under the Kyoto Protocol, are available and implemented by different countries. The schemes implemented in Australia are discussed in section 4.
3.1 Cap and trade schemes
Cap and trade schemes, also known as ETS, set a cap on the total volume of emissions for a given period and the government issues permits to emit that amount. The permits can be sold or freely issued and then traded by the purchasers (which need not be liable GHG emitters) at market prices. Permits must be surrendered to the government by liable GHG emitters to discharge their emission liability. An ETS is favoured by the Kyoto Protocol.
3.2 Carbon tax
A carbon tax is levied by government on the volume of GHG emissions and therefore imposes a fixed price for carbon giving certainty to the price of emissions. However, the impact on the volume of emissions is uncertain as it depends on the price elasticity of supply and demand for emissions intensive products. This makes it difficult to plan targets for emissions reductions.
3.3 Greenhouse gas credits
GHG credits(footnote 2) are permits or certificates denominated in units of GHG or renewable energy issued by government in recognition of GHG friendly activity such as generation of electricity from renewable sources or sustainable land use by farmers. For example, carbon credits may be issued with respect to activities designed to increase the amount of carbon stored in soil or vegetation. A certain amount of these tradeable credits can be purchased and surrendered by liable GHG emitters to meet mandatory obligations. In some cases the credits will trade in the same market as emissions permits and will be acceptable by government for acquittal of emissions liabilities.
3.4 Certified Emission Reductions and Emission Reduction Units
The Kyoto Protocol establishes three mechanisms through which countries can create and acquire Kyoto units (one tonne of CO2 equivalent) from other countries. These mechanisms, outlined in Section 2, result in potentially tradeable instruments. Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) are internationally traded instruments that allow developed countries to obtain credits for financing emissions reduction projects. CERs are for projects in developing countries. ERUs are for projects in developed countries. They are denominated in volume terms, with one CER/ERU equal to a reduction of one tonne of CO2 equivalent. Holders of CERs and ERUs are entitled to use them to offset their own GHG emissions to achieve their Kyoto or European Union emissions reduction targets. In effect, they operate as a carbon currency and are accepted in most existing and emerging national and regional ETS. The ERUs are given to the investor country and the emissions allowance of the host country is reduced by the same amount. CER and ERU projects include methane capture and re-use, energy efficiency improvements and renewable projects. Similar schemes can operate within countries, either as part of an ETS or independently. These schemes include bio-sequestration, replenishment of soil carbon and planting trees.
3.5 Private schemes
Private carbon offset schemes are voluntary schemes that are implemented by institutions and individuals in order to offset their carbon emissions. An example of these are the carbon offsetting schemes offered by certain airlines. Customers can voluntarily pay an additional amount when purchasing a ticket and fly 'carbon neutral' in order to offset the GHG emissions of their flight. The airlines use this money to purchase carbon credits issued by qualifying new renewable energy projects in a number of countries, including China and India. Each carbon credit is the equivalent of one tonne of CO2. The scheme is similar to the CER scheme, but any reduction in emissions is voluntary as most airlines do not have an official Kyoto reduction target. The offsets are registered under international voluntary offset standards but, unlike Kyoto units, they cannot be traded through intermediaries before reaching end users.
Private carbon offset schemes also operate through direct actions which promote the storage of carbon in vegetation or soil. These actions include tree planting and improving soil fertility.
3.6 Direct regulation
Direct regulation works through setting and enforcing limits on emissions via taxation and subsidies. The impact on the price of emissions is indirect and difficult to separate from other influences on prices. Businesses that reduce emissions below a baseline level can sell their CO2 abatement to the government and businesses that emit above a baseline level in order to negate penalties.
3.7 The impact of different instruments and schemes
All policy instruments for reducing GHG emissions have the same purpose, namely a targeted reduction in the volume of emissions. However, the various instruments have a different impact on price and volume of emissions. Instruments that impact price have an uncertain impact on volume, whereas instruments that directly impact volume have an uncertain effect on the price of emissions. For example, the ETS cap on emissions directly impacts the volume. However, the impact on the price of the instrument is determined by the market and is therefore uncertain. The price paid by liable GHG emitters is considered a tax on production. The tax is denominated in terms of the volume of carbon and the value of the tax paid by the emitter is uncertain. Table 1 shows the likely impacts of the various schemes on the price and volume of emissions.
The effect of the various policy instruments is an increase in the relative prices of emissions intensive processes and products. This provides incentives for producers to adopt more environmentally friendly modes of production and for consumers to switch to less emissions intensive products. Changes in relative prices may impact on producer and consumer preferences and adjust the structure of the economy. In theory, consumer preferences should change even when consumers are compensated for increases in energy prices.
4. THE AUSTRALIAN SCHEMES
4.1 The Clean Energy Acts
In December 2011 a number of related Commonwealth parliamentary acts were passed, collectively known as the Clean Energy Acts (see the Clean Energy Bill Explanatory Memorandum)(footnote 3) . These acts cover a wide range of initiatives, including what is effectively a carbon tax for a period, which will then be replaced by an ETS. These measures are also supplemented by compensation packages for certain classes of consumers and support for trade exposed industries. The carbon tax period is called the fixed price period, and the ETS will be introduced when the flexible price period commences.
Fixed price period
The Clean Energy Acts impose a carbon tax as a precursor to the introduction of an ETS. This came into effect from 1 July 2012. The carbon tax is expected to apply to 294 of the nation's carbon polluters in the first year. These liable GHG emitters will be obliged to surrender emission units in respect of their carbon pollution. The emission units are analogous to ETS permits, but they will be issued at a fixed price. The tax will be replaced by an ETS from 1 July 2015. During the fixed price period the following conditions apply:
In addition to these conditions, there is also a comprehensive set of measures to encourage environmentally friendly activities and compensation for disadvantaged consumers.
Flexible price period
The Clean Energy Acts provide for the introduction of an ETS from 1 July 2015 to replace the carbon tax. During the flexible price period the following conditions apply:
The Government has committed to using part of the revenue to compensate households for the expected increases in the prices of emissions intensive products.
RECs are an example of a GHG credit scheme but one which also contains elements of an ETS. RECs are created by the Australian Government under the Renewable Energy Act 2000 and are issued to large-scale generators of electricity from renewable sources (solar, wind etc.) and installers of small-scale solar, wind and hydro electricity systems. They are tradeable in the market and a certain amount must be purchased and surrendered by liable GHG emitters under the scheme (usually electricity retailers). One REC represents one MWh of renewable energy. Since January 2011, RECs have been divided into two certificate types: those promoting large scale renewable energy generation, Large-scale Generation Certificates (LGCs), for example commercial wind farms, and those promoting small scale renewable energy, Small-scale Technology Certificates (STCs), for example domestic solar panels. Liable GHG emitters must surrender RECs created under both schemes to discharge separate liabilities. Once issued, these certificates have all the characteristics of the trading component of an ETS.
The number of RECs purchased and surrendered by liable GHG emitters is set by the Government. This is determined by the Renewable Power Percentage (RPP) and the Small-scale Technology Percentage. The RPP is calculated to meet the Large-scale National Renewable Energy Target which aims for 41,850 gigawatt hours (GWhs) to be produced from renewable energy sources by 2020. This amount is approximately 20 percent of Australia's electricity supply(footnote 4). The target is regulated by the Clean Energy Regulator.
Similar schemes operate at state level, including:
4.3 Carbon Farming Initiative
The Carbon Farming Initiative (CFI) is a carbon credit scheme that gives landholders, farmers and forest growers incentives to undertake abatement projects. Australian Carbon Credit Units (ACCUs) are created by the Australian Government under the Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 and are issued free of charge for eligible GHG abatement activities undertaken as part of the scheme. Eligible activities generate GHG abatement by either reducing or avoiding emissions or removing carbon from the atmosphere and storing it in soil or vegetation. Abatement practices that are in use prior to July 1 2012 are not eligible, but obligations created under previous schemes, such as the Greenhouse Gas Reduction Scheme and Greenhouse Friendly, can be transferred to the CFI.
ACCUs are tradeable certificates that can be sold to liable GHG emitters who can then surrender them to the Clean Energy Regulator to discharge part of their emissions liabilities. Each ACCU represents one tonne of CO2 equivalent net abatement achieved through the performance of eligible activities. It is not mandatory that emitters purchase ACCUs specifically, but rather they are one form of certificate to enable emitters to discharge their emissions liability. Liable GHG emitters will only be able to surrender ACCUs totalling no more than five per cent of their liability during the fixed price period for carbon units. This limit will not apply during the flexible price period. CFI credits will be financial products for the purposes of the Corporations Act 2001 and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001(footnote 5).
5. STATISTICAL TREATMENT OF EMISSIONS PERMITS AND CREDITS IN ECONOMIC STATISTICS
5.1 International statistical standards
Emissions permits are unique policy instruments designed to achieve specific economic and environmental objectives. They have some properties of the broad category of contracts, leases and licenses and share certain characteristics with other types of permits issued by governments. However, emission permits have distinct features that make an exact comparison with other types of permits impossible.
The key standard in economic statistics is the United Nations System of National Accounts, the latest edition being 2008 (2008 SNA). The discussion of emissions trading schemes in this standard was found to be inadequate in the face of rapid development of schemes resulting from the climate change agenda. After a lengthy process of discussion by an international task force and consultation with countries by the Advisory Expert Group to the Intersecretariat Working Group on National Accounts (ISWGNA) that reports to the UNSC, the UNSC endorsed a recommendation to revise 2008 SNA(footnote 6),(footnote 7).
During the discussions and consultation there was broad agreement on most of the conceptual treatments that related to cap and trade ETS. The following builds on that broad agreement to include schemes other than ETS. There are four phenomena arising from different policy instruments that may result in economic transactions (an exchange of value between willing parties):
Table 2 outlines the treatment of different policy instruments available. In all cases (except voluntary schemes), the emission event results in an impost by government on emitters. Likewise, the impost is treated as a tax in all cases.
The main point of contention was whether the permits and certificates should be valued at historic cost or current market value. Depending on the valuation method chosen, two very different results will be evident in economic statistics for government revenue arising from the schemes and the associated costs to businesses. At the 43rd meeting of the UNSC in 2012 the historic cost approach was ratified. In addition to valuation questions for purchased permits, the decision has implications for the recognition and valuation of free permits and various other schemes that involve governments issuing tradeable instruments in return for greenhouse friendly activities.
To give effect to the recording of transactions at historic cost, a treatment named the split asset approach is recommended by the revised 2008 SNA. The asset (a permit or credit certificate) issued by government in relation to an ETS or other schemes is considered to have two components in the hands of the holder: a financial asset valued at historic cost, and a market valuation component to accommodate secondary market price variations. Thus the value of taxation revenue received on surrender of the permit or certificate will be the same as the cash received by the government at the time of auction or sale, possibly years earlier. The financial asset / liability component is classified as a tax prepayment (account payable / receivable) and the market price variation component is classified as a non-produced, non-financial asset. Market price variations are treated as other changes in volume for the asset. Following is the text of the decision:
The payments for emission permits, issued by governments under cap and trade schemes, should be recorded at the time the emissions occur as taxes, specifically other taxes on production (D29), on an accrual basis. The timing difference between the payments received by government for the permits and the time the emission occurs gives rise to a financial liability (accounts payable) for government and a financial asset (accounts receivable) for the holder. The difference between the pre-paid tax value of the permit and the market value of the permit represents a marketable contract (non-produced non-financial asset) for the holder. The creation and disappearance of the non-produced non-financial asset are recorded as an other change in volume of assets.
The approach to accruing payments for emission permits should be based on the underlying assumption that permits issued by a particular country are more likely than not to be surrendered in that country.
In the simple case of a pure national scheme, the taxes should be accrued in the following way. The tax recorded for any single permit surrendered in relation to emissions that occurred in period t is equivalent to the total stock of relevant other accounts payable divided by the total number of active permits issued (and remaining in circulation) at time t. The relevant other accounts payable should in theory exclude any permits that were surrendered after time t in respect of emissions that occurred before time t. Equally, the total number of active permits (and remaining in circulation) at time t, should also exclude these permits. In practice, however, it can be assumed, for simplicity, that the time the permit is surrendered is the same as the time that emissions occur, as long as there is no significant lag between the two events and the lag is constant(footnote 8).
5.2 Consideration of the UNSC Decision by the ABS
The ABS disagrees with the decision by the UNSC, and considers that the endorsed treatments will distort the impact of these schemes on both government and business statistics, particularly as represented in the national accounts, but also in other bodies of economic and environmental statistics. To the extent that market prices for permits at time of emission or time of surrender of permit will be under or over cash paid at the time of their issue, the ABS considers that the split asset approach will misrepresent:
Accordingly, the ABS has consulted with stakeholders about the implications of deviating from recommended international standards.
The alternative considered and rejected by the ISWGNA to the split asset approach is named the financial asset approach. Under this treatment every transaction (exchange of value) is valued at market price. The auction of a permit is recorded at the price paid, the resulting asset (holder of permit) and liability (of government to recognise the permit) is valued at market price of CO2 on balance sheets with valuation variation being recorded in the revaluation accounts, the tax liabilities of emitters and tax receivables by government valued at the prevailing price of CO2, and the surrender of the permit that discharges the tax liability at the price of CO2 prevailing at the date of surrender. To the extent that the financial asset and liability represented by the permits or certificates are tradeable on secondary markets, the asset / liability should be classified as a debt security, not a tax prepayment in the national accounts.
The principal argument against the financial asset approach is that tax revenues will not necessarily equal cash paid. The ABS does not consider this equality to be a necessary property of accrual accounting, particularly given the presence of financial assets that are denominated in prices other than domestic currency, in this case the price of CO2. Pricing CO2 is the central objective of an ETS.
Consultation to date with stakeholders concerning the ABS preference for the financial asset approach has resulted in the clarification that a priority is measurement of the cash flow statement of government. As both approaches to emissions permits measurement are concerned with the accrual basis for government accounts, the main concern was that assets and liabilities arising from a treatment would impact the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) cash surplus/deficit, as the emission permits are for an operational purpose. Under cash flow statement conventions creation and extinguishment of:
Under cash accounting conventions cash payments received in respect of a future tax receivable are operating revenue, regardless of whether the deferred receipt is carried forward under accrual accounting conventions in the form of a debt security. Therefore, the ABS has decided that for GFS only, tradeable permits will be classified as accounts payable / receivable on the balance sheet to align with cash flow conventions. This approach will not result in any difference in the measure of net worth in the GFS balance sheet. Tradeable permits will be classified as debt securities in the national accounts.
5.3 The treatment of economic transactions and Australian policy instruments in ABS economic statistics
Table 3 summarises the treatment in national accounts and other ABS economic statistics of the emissions policy instruments currently in existence in Australia, or soon to be so, under the financial asset approach preferred by the ABS.
5.4 Development of data sources
The ABS is developing methods of measuring the schemes listed in the above table in consultation with other government agencies. Estimates for stocks and flows of RECs have been compiled with the assistance of the Clean Energy Regulator back to the commencement of the scheme in 2000. Initial estimates for RECs and fixed price period Clean Energy Acts permits are expected to be incorporated into economic statistics commencing with the September 2012 reference quarter. A particular challenge in achieving this is the compilation of accruals data from permits register data that reflects reporting and acquittals delays.
The data being developed are stocks and flows for permits, taxes and grants paid and received in nominal and volume terms. In general the method is to account for permits and other items in physical terms (tonnes of CO2 or MWh of green energy), and generate monetary (nominal) values by applying market prices to the physical volumes. The nominal values will be deflated where necessary into chain volume (monetary volumes) by using appropriate deflators. The datasets compiled by this method will be useful for both economic and environmental accounting.
5.5 Compensation and incentive packages
The Government has announced comprehensive compensation packages for consumers and industries impacted by the introduction of the policy instruments and incentives for development of renewable energy supply. Delivery of compensation and incentives will be through a wide variety of methods.
Some delivery methods are embedded in the emissions permits schemes (free permits for trade exposed industries) and other schemes for certain activities. The ABS will measure these along with the methods being developed for the other components of these schemes. Other delivery methods use social security, the taxation system and development fund processes. The ABS expects that compensation and incentives delivered by these means will be measured via normal data sources.
Because of the different methods of delivery and measurement of compensation and incentive packages, the ABS will not provide an assessment of the net impacts of the packages.
5.6 Impact on ABS economic statistics
Carbon pricing changes the relative prices of high and low emissions intensive goods. The extent that any carbon costs translate into general increases in prices depends on a range of factors. Carbon pricing will be occurring at the same time as normal variations in prices are occurring driven by productivity, the terms of trade or changing preferences. The extent to which businesses pass on the carbon price will depend on their consideration of issues such as operating costs, margins, and other economic factors (such as degree of competition).
From the September quarter 2012, ABS economic statistics will reflect the impact of measures under the fixed price period. The statistics likely to be impacted are the Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product, (cat. no. 5206.0), Government Finance Statistics, Australia, (cat. no. 5512.0), Consumer Price Index, Australia, (cat. no. 6401.0) and many survey results. The ABS will not be able to quantify the impact of carbon pricing, compensation or other government incentives and will not be producing estimates of price change exclusive of the carbon price or measuring the impact of the carbon price. Any changes in the prices charged by companies for their outputs, paid by companies for their inputs or paid by consumers, will be reflected in the suite of price indexes and other economic statistics compiled and published by the ABS. Further information on the expected impacts of the introduction of carbon pricing is available in the publication Strong Growth, Low Pollution - Modelling a Carbon Price(footnote 9).
6. STATISTICAL TREATMENT OF EMISSIONS PERMITS AND CREDITS IN ENVIRONMENTAL STATISTICS AND ACCOUNTS
The linkage between the environment and the economy has been recognised by the development of the System of Environmental and Economic Accounting (SEEA).
6.1 The System of Environmental-Economic Accounting
The UNSC adopted the international statistical standard, the SEEA, on 2 March 2012(footnote 10). This standard has since been adopted by the ABS and the international statistical community for environmental accounts. The SEEA is a stand-alone system that is coherent and complementary with other international standards including 2008 SNA. Accounts and statistics produced under this standard bring environmental and economic information together in a common framework. This allows for consistent analysis of the contribution of the environment to the economy, the impact of the economy on the environment and the efficiency of the use of environmental resources within the economy.
The global atmosphere is not subject to international boundaries or ownership rights. In environmental terms it is an important asset and plays a vital role in the health of the biosphere. It does not constitute an economic asset in that proprietary rights cannot be exercised. However, pricing carbon does bring some aspects of atmospheric pollution within the scope of economic statistics, and brings economic and environment accounts closer.
ABS economic and environment statistics will adopt the same conceptual treatments for the monetary transactions related to emissions permits and other schemes. As outlined in section 5.4, construction of datasets that can meet both economic and environment statistics coherently is a goal. It is expected that these will be based on administrative datasets such as those maintained by the Clean Energy Regulator.
It should be noted that the physical accounting for CO2 is still in development as part of the development of the SEEA ecosystem accounts. It is apparent that not all physical flows have a monetary counterpart and vice versa. Some adjustments to accounting treatments may be needed to ensure coherence between physical and monetary measures of carbon stocks and flows.
6.2 Emissions reporting arrangements in Australia
Corporations registered under the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 are obliged to report their GHG emissions, energy production and energy consumption to the Clean Energy Regulator. Reported emissions fall into two categories:
It should be noted that the second type of emissions from one facility are emissions from an up-stream facility. The Clean Energy Regulator is required to publish the reported totals of GHG emissions and energy consumption in an attempt to keep the public informed about Australian corporations GHG emissions and energy flows. The National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting System (NGERS) data are also intended to underpin the introduction of an ETS in future and to meet Australia's international reporting obligations.
The reported emissions are potentially taxable. In the event of a cap being placed on total emissions registered emitters would be obliged to acquire permits, either at auction or on the market, in order to acquit their tax liabilities to government.
In 2010, information published by the Clean Energy Regulator only included corporations that emitted 87.5+ kilotonnes of emissions. The reporting threshold was reduced from the 125 kilotonnes threshold in 2000. The reporting requirements do not apply to individuals or the majority of government entities. They also do not apply to GHG emissions from agriculture, land use change and forestry sources in relation to biological processes.
Inquiries regarding this information paper may be directed to:
Macroeconomic Research Section
Australian Bureau of Statistics
PO Box 10
BELCONNEN ACT 2616
Telephone: (02) 6252 7139
1 There are several legislative Acts in the greenhouse energy legislative package, including the Clean Energy Act (2011) itself. This paper refers to this package of legislation as the Clean Energy Acts. <back
2 A range of policy instruments are designed to reduce GHG emissions many of which are denominated in units besides CO2. Carbon credits are denominated in tonnes of CO2 whereas others such as renewable energy certificates are denominated in megawatt hours. This paper refers to these policy instruments collectively as GHG credits. <back
3 See Commonwealth of Australia 2011, Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Bill 2011.
4 See Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator (ORER) 2011, Financial Annual Report 2010-2011, Australian Government, Canberra.
5 See Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency 2012, Carbon Farming Initiative Handbook. Australian Government. Canberra.
6 See United Nations Statistical Division, Intersecretariat Working Group in National Accounts (ISWGNA), SNA News, New York.
Number 30/31 2011 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna/nn30-31-en.pdf <back
7 See United Nations Statistical Division, Intersecretariat Working Group in National Accounts (ISWGNA), SNA News, New York.
Number 32/33 2012 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna/nn32-33-En.pdf <back
8 See United Nations Statistical Division, Intersecretariat Working Group in National Accounts (ISWGNA), SNA News, New York.
Number 32/33 2012 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna/nn32-33-En.pdf <back
9 See The Australian Treasury 2011, Strong Growth, Low Pollution: Modelling A Carbon Price, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.
10 See Australian Bureau of Statistics 2012, Completing the Picture - Environmental Accounting in Practice, cat. no. 4628.0.55.001, ABS, Canberra.
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